Research
I am a Microeconomic Theorist specialising in network games.
My supervisor is Professor Matt Elliot.
Working Papers
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Peace in the Face of Uncertainty: Resource Allocation with Stochastic Armaments
This paper examines a government's strategic resource allocation choices when facing an opposing group whose military power is uncertain. We investigate how this uncertainty affects the government's decision to divide resources in a way that either guarantees peace, despite unresolved uncertainty, or risks conflict. We find that under low uncertainty, the government prefers distributions which ensure peace, while under high uncertainty, they are willing to risk war. When uncertainty is low, the government's allocation is decreasing in uncertainty. When uncertainty is high it is increasing. The latter leads to an increased probability of fighting and falling total welfare.
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Network Threshold Games
This paper studies the general class of games where agents: (1) are embedded on a network, (2) have two possible actions, and (3) these actions are strategic complements. We use a measure of network cohesiveness -- the k-core -- to provide a novel characterisation of the equilibria. After transforming the network appropriately, the k-core fully describes both the minimal and maximal equilibria, and also provides a partial characterisation of all others. This framework is also the binary action version of the large class of network games with strategic complements and continuous actions.
Curriculum Vitae
You can download my CV here.