Research
I am a Microeconomic Theorist specialising in network games.
My supervisor is Professor Matt Elliot.
Working Papers
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Symmetries in Network Games
Many economic settings feature agents who only care about certain others' decisions and are thus network games. However, characterising network games' behaviour is difficult. We introduce tools from algebraic graph theory that leverage the network's symmetries. Symmetries fold networks up so that nodes on either side of the fold occupy identical positions. We apply symmetries to equilibrium characterisation and reveal sufficient limitations on network structure that enable novel comparative statics without common necessary restrictions. In targeting interventions, symmetries govern how changes to agents' incentives flow through the network and reveal a sharp contrast in large budget settings. With complements, agents with identical network positions are targeted identically. With substitutes, targeting can differentiate between positionally equivalent agents by redistributing their original total equilibrium action.
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Network Threshold Games
This paper proposes a new lens for studying threshold games played on networks when the thresholds are heterogeneous. These are games where agents have two possible actions, and prefer action 1 if and only if enough of their neighbours choose action 1. We propose a transformation of the network that 'absorbs' the heterogeneity in thresholds into the network. This allows us to characterise equilibria in terms of the k-core — a well-studied measure of network cohesiveness — of the transformed network. Our model is also the direct analogy to the workhorse model of Ballester et. Al (2006) when actions are 0 or 1. Further, our binary action version exhibits a remarkable stability property. When agents have linear-quadratic preferences, the k-core of the transformed network characterises the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential move version of the game — no matter what order agents move in.
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Peace in the Face of Uncertainty: Resource Allocation with Stochastic Armaments
This paper examines a government's strategic resource allocation choices when facing an opposing group whose military power is uncertain. We investigate how this uncertainty affects the government's decision to divide resources in a way that either guarantees peace, despite unresolved uncertainty, or risks conflict. We find that under low uncertainty, the government prefers distributions which ensure peace, while under high uncertainty, they are willing to risk war. When uncertainty is low, the government's allocation is decreasing in uncertainty. When uncertainty is high it is increasing. The latter leads to an increased probability of fighting and falling total welfare.
Curriculum Vitae
You can download my CV here.